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The Dominican Grassroots Movement and 
the Organized Left, 1978-1986 
EMELIO BETANCES* 
ABSTRACT. Through their struggles for better services, grassroots 
movements played a large role in the process of democratization 
and construction of social citizenship in the Dominican Republic. 
The modern grassroots movement, especially in relation to the 
uprising of April 1984, challenged the government's neoliberal 
policies and opened the way for the emergence of an indepen­
dent movement that confronted both left-wing parties and orga­
nized labor. However, because the gains from expanding social 
citizenship remained limited in the face of the Dominican state's 
inability to formulate socio-economic policies, the movements at 
best posed a worthwhile goal that Dominican society may revisit 
in the near future. 
Introduction 
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS REMAIN PERTINENT to under­standing die course of Latin American history and the demo­cratic process. The revolutionary forces of the 1970s and 1980s 
thought that these movements could be used as conduits to promote 
the construction of a socialist society. However, the grassroots move­
ments themselves only sought ways to resolve their social issues within 
capitalist confines. They were the organized expression of people 
who live in low-income neighborhoods and who make their living in 
both the formal and informal economy. They include proletarians, 
* I want to thank my colleagues Hobart Spalding, Barbara Heisler, Christopher Mitchell, and 
Carlos Vilas, the anonymous reviewers of Science Society for their comments, and Isabel 
VaUela and Thomas Deveny for their help with the translation from Spanish. 
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semi-proletarians, the unemployed, shopkeepers, peasants evicted 
from their lands, people who make their living on a day-to-day basis, 
etc. A clear conflict existed between grassroots movements and petty 
bourgeois revolutionaries. In some cases, the movements joined to 
challenge capitalism, and they succeeded in Cuba (1959) and Nica­
ragua (1979); but elsewhere the story differed and the grassroots 
suffered defeat ie.g., Brazil, 1964; Chile, 1973). The Latin American 
grassroots had to struggle within the capitalist system to press their 
demands for social citizenship rights. The Dominican movement mir­
rors the larger reality of Latin America as it fought for basic social 
rights. 
This article analyzes the role played by grassroots movements in 
the Dominican Republic. Focusing on the early stages of the 1980s 
protest cycle, I argue that in their struggles for better services, grass­
roots movements contributed to the process of democratization aftd 
construction of social citizenship. Challenging the sta'te to recognize 
social citizenship rights, these movements opened a new chapter in 
Dominican social history. For their part, the managers of the state and 
the elite faced serious limitations fulfilling the promises of democracy 
because of deep-seated social inequalities. 
Confronting these challenges, the grassroots movement waged a 
long struggle to get recognized and, in the process, started to build 
citizenship rights, demonstrating that social citizenship resulted from 
struggles between those at the bottom and those at the top. Because the 
IMF and the United States stripped the Dominican state of its power 
to formulate socioeconomic policies, the grassroots ofily achieved 
limited gains. The maximum achievement was to set a worthwhile 
goal that Dominican society may revisit someday. 
Theoretical Framework 
Two sets of literature frame the analysis of the social movement 
and the construction of social citizenship. The first focuses on how 
social movements have challenged neoliberal economic policies and 
promoted democratization (Caetano, etal, 2006; Stahler-Sholk, etal, 
2008; Lopez Maya, 1999; Lopez Maya, et al., 2008; Boron and Lechini, 
2006; Lopez Maya, et al, 2010; Webber and Carr, 2013). Despite the 
strong links that the literature finds between social movements and 
democratization, few have ventured to study social movements and 
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the development of social citizenship (Dagnino, 2003; Holston, 2008; 
Merklen, 2005). To overcome this limitation, this article draws on 
citizenship studies to analyze the contested nature of social citizen­
ship in Latin America. The works of T. H. Marshall (1964), Anthony 
Giddens (1985),David Held (1989), Engin F. Isin and Bryan S.Turner 
(2002), and Engin F. Isin (2008) provide the analytical framework. 
Marshall suggests that citizenship is comprised of three compo­
nents: civil, political, and social rights. He noticed considerable over­
lap between the last two, recognized the inequalities and injustices 
produced by capitalism and state institutions, but saw the develop­
ment of citizenship as a process of extension of rights that eventu­
ally strengthen society, increasing social solidarity and reducing class 
conflict. 
The civil right became, for the workers, an instrument of raising their social 
and economic status, that is to say, for establishing the claim that they, as 
citizens, were entitled to certain social rights. But the normal method of estab­
lishing social rights is by the exercise of political power, for social rights imply 
an absolute right to a certain standard of civilization which is conditional only 
oh the discharge of the general duties of citizenship. (Marshall, 1964, 94.) 
Social movements played a fundamental role in exercising influence 
'on political power and gaining rights. Unlike Marshall, who focused on 
workers' movements in England, this article concentrates on struggles 
of grassroots movements for social rights such as education, healthcare, 
housing, and public infrastructure that are at the center of the process 
of construction of citizenship rights. Unlike worker struggles that oper­
ate within the confines of a capitalist enterprise, the grassroots may 
be outside the factory, but their informal economic operations also 
take place within "the capitalist system. Like workers' movements they 
make claims on the capitalist state and, as such, contribute to building 
social citizenship. As Marshall noted, it takes a long time for groups 
to develop legislation and to exert effective pressure on the state. In 
order to understand the construction of social citizenship'in Latin 
America, this article builds on Isin's suggestion to focus on processes 
and relationships that underUne the formation and definition of social 
groups. Concentrating on the social in citizenship means: 
(1) These groups are socially constructed; (2) social processes of inclusion 
and exclusion are at work for each type of right; (3) unequal social relations 
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are centrally located; (4) we cannot start from the premise that equality 
requires sameness; and (5) differentiated rights can ameliorate historical 
inequalities and injustice. A focus on the social in citizenship challenges the 
notion that citizenship comprises a static and universalistic legal status of ab­
stract individuals in nadon-states. To interrogate what is social in cidzenship 
means drawing attention to the process-oriented and contested character of 
citizenship. (Isin, 2008,11.) 
The making of social citizenship is the product of struggles waged 
by labor and grassroots movements over a significant period of time; 
social citizenship acquires the historic characteristics of a particular 
social formation. At the same time, citizenship remains a source of 
conflict, as the political regime formally recognizes certain social 
rights, but the capitalist economic system denies them. Thus, (:itizens 
must continuously challenge the ruling power to get their rights rec­
ognized even after legislation has been passed. 
The development of social citizenship in Europe and Latin Amer­
ica contrasts sharply. In Europe, citizenship emerged in conditions of 
strong endogenous economic development and diminishing social 
inequality. Colonialism and imperialist domination enabled Europe 
to extract resources from the peripheries and create markets for their 
goods. These conditions allowed some European countries to begin 
expanding social citizenship rights in the latter third of the 19th cen­
tury, but most particularly following World War 11. The postwar expan­
sion continued until the 1970s, when social citizenship rights began 
to decUne, a reminder that the struggle for social rights is recurrent 
and dependent on periodic capitalist crises. 
In the European case democracy emerged as a political regime 
that combined two components: a system of rules/actors/institutions 
and a socioeconomic decision-making system. These two components 
emerged in a historical context of the rise of industrial capitalism, 
with a national culture that developed and facilitated identification 
between representatives and represented. 
In contrast, Latin America experienced the legacy of neocolonial­
ism: deep economic inequalities. The system of rules/actors/institu­
tions separated socio-economic decision-making from the political 
regime because of economic dependence. In addition, ethnic and 
regional differences and the retarded development of a cohesive 
national culture in many countries deterred the full development 
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would contribute to the construction of social citizenship. In fact, 
many of the Neighborhood Committees developed with the support 
of the PRD made demands on behalf of the communities and stated 
the need for establishing institutional mechanisms for resolving local 
public issues. 
The Neighborhood Committees recruited many people living in 
the slums of cities to work on community-based projects. They pro­
vided services such as "disposal of solid wastes, upkeep of recreational 
parks, street signs, tree planting, organizing vigilance to maintain 
order and combat delinquency, the construction of sports venues and 
other community activities with the collaboration of the local govern­
ment and neighborhood self-help groups" (Perez and Artiles, 1992, 
139-140). Up to a point, these Neighborhood Committees contin­
ued the work done by the cultural clubs, but now the Neighborhood 
Committees carried out their activities in coordination with the local 
government. In her study of grassroots organizations in the 1980s, 
Tajira Vargas found that in the neighborhoods of Santo Domingo the 
Neighborhood Committees constituted 33.50% of tiie total number 
of community organizations, the cultural clubs 18.70%, and women's 
groups 11.67% (Vargas, 1994,94). This data shows tiie important push 
provided by the PRD in the organization of Neighborhood Commit­
tees. However, this experiment did not prove successful at the ground 
level of the poor neighborhoods surrounding the Capital and in the 
provinces, because the Neighborhood Committees began to be seen as 
mechanisms controlled by the state, which was attempting to limit the 
development of independent communities. Moreover, in the middle 
of an economic crisis, the state itself could not respond to the expec­
tations created by the plan to establish Neighborhood Committees. 
They soon beca'rhe government job search mechanisms and victims 
of the political rivalries among the various tendencies that existed 
within the PRD. This situation caused many Neighborhood Commit­
tees to become independent and to search for their own solutions to 
the concrete problems in their communities (Matias, 1991, 30). This 
experience shows that in the 1980s the organization of autonomous 
Neighborhood Committees contributed significantiy to the cohesion 
of communities in the poor neighborhoods.^ 
1 Details and analysis of the neighborhood committees in the provinces are in my not-yet-
published manuscript, "En busca de la ciudadania: movimientos sociales y democratizacion 
en la Repiibhca Dominicana." 
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The second option for neighborhoods during the 1980s was a 
revolutionary solution proposed by Left. The Partido Comunista del 
Trabajo (PCT — Communist Workers' Party) proposed the creation 
of the CLPs for the purpose of creating political conditions that would 
lead to a revolutionary situation such as the one that had produced 
the uprising of 1965. The CLPs thought the political situation in the 
Dominican Republic resembled that of elsewhere in Central America, 
where significant revolutionary processes unfolded (Franco, interview, 
2010). The idea for the creation of the CLPs emerged in the midst 
of a strike by the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Telefonicos 
(SNTT — National Union of Telephone Workers) during 1982-1983. 
This union had been in conflict with the Compahia Dominicana de 
Telefonos (CODETEL — Dominican Telephone Company). Draw­
ing the attention of the population led to a solidarity campaign. Left 
militants created the CLPs to strengthen this solidarity and in defense 
of the workers. 
Even though left parties created CLPs, they included members 
of the cultural clubs, people without any party affiliation. They also 
included members of Neighborhood Committees and the Comuni-
dades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs — Ecclesiastic Base Communities), 
small church groups inspired by liberation theology.^ Pedro Franco, 
one of the founders of the first CLPs, states that it was created in an 
open assembly (Franco, interview, 2010). According to Franco, the 
CLPs had their origins in a labor conflict. However, other social and 
political actors continued the groundwork for such organizations to 
emerge in the North Zone neighborhoods of the city. It is worth not­
ing that the majority of the leaders were leftist militants who did not 
reside in poor neighborhoods. Most were students from the Univer-
sidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo (UASD), the public university. 
The CLP organizational structure was more elitist and differed froin 
that of the grassroots organizations, which were more flexible. In addi­
tion, they assigned slum-dwellers a secondary role in the struggles. 
According to Fidel Santana, there was no massive participation in the 
CLPs. "The people wouldjoin these organizations because of slogans. 
These slogans were the point of contact between the activist militants 
and the community. If the community needed a school, something 
2 For a detailed analysis of the CEBs, see my book The Catholic Church and Power Politics in Latin 
America: The Dominican Case in Comparative Perspective. 
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that moved the people, we would begin creating propaganda based 
on that demand" (Santana, interview, 2007). 
Diverse groups of the left employed CLPs for organizing the poor 
neighborhoods. Prior to its intervention in the slums, the left was frag­
mented into multiple political groupings, all of which participated in 
some way in the construction and development of the CLPs. This frag­
mentation influenced the operations of CLPs negatively. Nonetheless, 
all of the groups used the clubs and the Neighborhood Committees 
to reach out to communities. Victor Geronimo tells of the time when 
he became a member of the Club del Progreso, noticing that there 
was a discrepancy between the theory and the practice of that club: 
The club did not implement any action in favor of and identified with the 
needs of the people of Cienaga. As a result, we proposed the foundation of 
the Movimiento Cultural y Deportivo Club Marcelino Vega, with objectives 
that matched the needs of the people who lived there. We thought that the 
word "club" was a foreign term; we did not understand why it was called that. 
We wanted a cultural movement that would seek progress and facilitate the 
demands of the community. (Geronimo, interview, 2007.) 
Evidendy, Geronimo's group brought a different ideology that 
did not fit in with the organization of the members of the local club, 
and that is why he saw the need to rename and restructure some of 
the clubs so that they could respond to this new strategy. 
The CLPs were a type of vanguard that operated in the name of 
the residents, and militants risked their liyes in clashes with the Police 
and the National Army. In truth, however, they were organizations 
created for immediate needs, operated nationwide, but did not have 
a community basje. "The lack of a community base explains why the 
CLPs privileged general problems over the local and particular ones 
of the communities" (Matias, 1991, 37). The CLPs had their sights 
set primarily on a socialist revolution; however, their attention to the 
demands of the people was their way of approaching the poor neigh­
borhoods. This explains why 
these organizations were not successful in creating a structure that would link 
them either to the population or to its base. Their composition was never 
broad, nor did it have permanent roots in a territorial or spatial sense. The 
political parties that guided the CLPs established the goals and objectives of 
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these organizations. This might explain why there was no coherence in their 
actions or in their proposals. (Perez and Artiles, 1992,101.) 
The objectives of most CLTs and the community did not match. In 
the long term, they did not succeed in laying roots in the community 
where they conducted their activities. Community residents wanted 
to build social citizenship by demanding that the state resolve issues 
related to social services such as school, health, water, construction 
and repair of streets and roads, while the CLPs wanted to create the 
conditions for a socialist revolution. 
Nevertheless, the CLPs spread throughout the-country and, in 
particular, in the Northeast region of Cibao. Despite their limitations, 
the CLPs helped to awaken a degree of social and political awareness. 
They did not foster formation of stable organizations that could pro­
mote the development of social citizenship. 
The'Uprising of April 1984 
The uprising of 1984, a watershed in Dominican history, deserves 
special attention in explaining the political and social consequences of 
stripping the capacity of the state's socioeconomic decision-making sys­
tem. Local managers of the state kept insisting that they were defend­
ing democracy, but while doing it, they were physically eliminating 
citizens. The violence unleashed by security forces against insurgents 
was only comparable to the revolt of 1965, when two factions of the 
armed forces clashed. The uprising also constituted a turning point in 
the relationship between the popular sectors and the regime headed 
by Salvador Jorge Blanco of the PRD (1982-1986). During his electoral 
campaign, Jorge Blanco had promised to move from political opening 
to prosperity and many citizens expected that he would deliver. The 
uprising constituted a wake-up call for the state and the socioeconomic 
elite regarding the living conditions of a population whose rights as 
citizens, recognized by the Constitution of the Republic, were actually 
not respected by a regime that only seemed interested in the imple­
mentation of neoliberal policies. 
Without the capacity to manage socioeconomic policy, govern­
ment institutions remained empty-handed and forced to break the 
promises made to the impoverished neighborhoods of Dominican 
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cities. Citizens from the lower echelons of society learned a hard 
lesson: They lacked any protection from the political system that 
promised them civil, political and social rights. In the meantime, 
the uprising gave birth to a thriving grassroots movement that began 
to pressure the government, at least for that moment, to recognize 
citizenship rights. 
Salvador Jorge Blanco realized that if he accepted the conditions 
that the IMF imposed in order to provide additional loans, social 
stability would be in danger, because the poorest segments of society 
would be the most seriously affected. In a letter datedjanuary 2,1984, 
and addressed to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 
the Dominican head of state wrote: 
The International Monetary Fund insists on demanding violent adjustments 
to the exchange system, disproportionate tax increases, excessive restrictions 
in budgetary financing, accelerated canceling of our external obligations, 
and a set of objectives for 1984. These objectives will be impossible to achieve, 
if one takes into account the drop in price in our exportable goods, espe­
cially sugar, and the difficulty in obtaining outside resources, due ... to the 
international economic slowdown. {Hoy, 1984.) 
He reminded President Reagan that even the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) made its support programs 
conditional on his government signing an agreement with the IMF, 
and he complained that this attitude brought into question the friend­
ship and open collaboration that his administration had with the 
United States. President Reagan curtly responded: 
While we sympathize with your desire to minimize the social and economic 
hardships associated with the economic adjustment program, we believe 
that a process of stabilization and adjustment is inevitable. If we delayed the 
process the difficulties will get worse in the short run Once an accord 
has been reached, I can assure you there will be a rapid ouday of assistance 
funds by the government of the United States. {Hoy, 1984.) 
Reagan's response made it clear that the Dominican government 
had-no choice but to negotiate with the IMF, and consequentiy, Jorge 
Blanco later traveled to Washington to meet with its director, Jacques 
DeLarosiere. Following his return to the Dominican Republic, the 
President waited until the beginning of Holy Week to address the 
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nation and explain the results of his trip. He thought that giving his 
speech while the more well-to-do were vacationing at the nation's 
beaches and rivers would diminish its impact. But the leader seemed 
to forget that the residents of poor neighborhoods could not afford 
to go on vacation. On the evening of Monday, April 17 he announced 
that the agreement with the IMF would not imply a reduction in the 
level of public expenditure, nor of the autonomous organs of the state. 
Besides, there would be no transfer—for the moment—of petroleum 
and its derivatives to the currency free market. Further negotiations 
had obtained international financing for import of basic food stuffs, 
which also would not enter the currency free market. Nevertheless, 
the leader recognized that 
these measures would significantly affect the budget of the Dominican fam­
ily, and in a particular way, the basic family food basket of social groups with 
limited incomes.... I have arranged that, through the price cohtrol'mecha-
nisms for consumable goods that the Institute for the Stabilization of Prices 
(INESPRE) distributes, the final retail price for five food products that make 
up the national diet be maintained at the current level. (Jorge Blanco, 1984a.) 
The transfer to the currency free market of all goods except 
petroleum, its derivatives, and five basic food products meant that 
the m^ority of the population would have to shoulder the increase 
in prices. In a tour of supermarkets and small establishments in the 
city of Santo Domingo by journalists from£^ National following the 
President's^ speech, they reported unanimous opposition to these 
measures, because the increases in prices were practically automatic 
in those establishments that already had goods on their shelves when 
the increases were announced. The Holy Week truce did not stop 
incisive commentaries by the residents of poor neighborhoods, and 
people from the middle classes who could not leave on vacation {El 
Nacional, 1984a). 
The impoverished felt most strongly the generalized rise in prices, 
in both the capital and cities of the interior. These price increases 
proved dverwhelming for slum dwellers residing in the north of Santo 
Domingo and in the interior. Although unanimity existed regarding 
the intolerable nature of these increases, during Holy Week people 
only complained about it, and no collective protest erupted. This did 
not occur until Monday, April 23 in the nortiiern part of the city, when 
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youths gathered in assembly and decided to call for a 12-hour work 
stoppage. They convened residents to protest against the measures 
announced by Presidentjorge Blanco. Young people in over a dozen 
other neighborhoods heeded this call. 
Both those who called for the stoppage in Capotillo and the police 
were surprised by what happened. The police quickly arrived in the 
neighborhoods and began to arrest as many people as they could, or 
simply fired on the demonstrators. On the first day of the protests, 
six people lost their lives, 30 received gunshot wounds, and 300 were 
arrested (vVzcona, Monegro and Peiia, 1984). Although the Police 
Chief, Jose Felix Hermida Gonzalez, declared at midday that "every­
thing was under control," Special Operations agents were deployed 
in the neighborhoods. These forces had been trained by the MAAG 
(Military Assistance Advisory Group from the United States) to handle 
urban and rural counterinsurgency (CEDEE, 1984, 8-9). 
News about events taking place in the capital's neighborhoods 
spread throughout the country and protests erupted in different parts 
of cities in the interior. Police detained demonstrators in several places 
in the Cibao and in one locale demonstrators sacked and set fire to 
an INESPRE grocery store. Protests also broke out in the northeast. 
In the city of Santiago the multitude sacked and set fire to the local 
headquarters of the PRD. Similar events took place in dozens of slums 
and burning tires blocked roads. Interestingly, all the areas affected 
by the uprising represented the most impoverished in that particular 
locale. In the south, police reported destruction of various commer­
cial establishments and the arrest of more than 40 people. Looting, 
clashes with the police, and arrests occurred throughout the Qbao. 
On the second day of disturbances, the national death toll reached 
44, along with niore than 150.victims of gunshot wounds. The police 
admitted to 35 deaths in two days of disturbances, indicating the 
grave magnitude of these incidents {El Nacional, April 25,1984; Ultima 
Hora, April 25, 1984). The authorities also acknowledged that they 
had detained hundreds, but that many had nothing to do with the 
outbreaks, being only spectators. They were subsequendy freed. 
On April 25, the third day of disturbances, protests continued in 
neighborhoods of the capital and various interior cities. The police 
and Secret Service agents shot at least one man at close range without 
any exchange of words. A woman who ran a street concession received 
several gunshot wounds and later died. By the end of the uprising 
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estimates varied on the number of casualties. Huchi Lora, a recognized 
journalist, reported that according to the Dominican Commission 
on Human Rights, 70 identifiable dead existed, along with 50 more 
still not officially identified. Lora reported that 157 people had been 
wounded and 4,358 arrested (CEDEE, 1984, 7-13, Gonzalez, 1984; 
Peiia, 1984; Lora, 1984). 
The magnitude of the uprising caused Presidentjorge Blanco to 
address the nation on the night of April 25. Surrounded by the top 
brass of the Armed Forces, a way of showing viewers that he had the 
support of the military, the President convenientiy forgot the words he 
used to address U. S. President Reagan when he clairned that a relative 
monetary stability characterized the country and that "a sharp rise in 
the inflation rate undoubtedly would provoke such strong social ten­
sions that they would disrupt the peace and the democratic process." 
He stated that the leftist political opposition and the Reformist Party 
had fomented the violence and that the burning of PRD headquarters, 
arson in the sugar fields to damage the economy, and obstruction of 
highway, roads and bridges impeding traffic demonstrated this. The 
President declared that 
these incidents are among the most violent recorded in the democratic 
period of the country since 1961. Alongside this, we must recognize the 
intervention of our Armed Forces and of the National Police. Faced with the 
aggressions against citizens and against themselves, they defended public 
and private property and restrained their reactions with reasonable pru­
dence. .. . This speaker will not hesitate or vacillate at any time to continue 
assuming all the responsibilities that the exercise of power imposes. Those 
who hold the hope of twisting the course of our history deceive themselves. 
(Jorge Blanco, 1984b.) 
Jorge Blanco's speech was not well received by much of the population, 
and this editorial in El Nuevo Diario seemed to reflect this sentiment: 
It is necessary to condemn the anarchy that shook the capital and the im­
portant major cities of the country.... They foolishly destroyed local public 
vehicles and looted or burned private establishments, especially small and 
mid-sized businesses. But the response on the part of the forces of public 
order is absolutely unacceptable. Their intention was to kill citizens, many 
of whom were innocent, shooting indiscriminately in order to kill, as was 
demonstrated by the number of people who lost their lives, estimated to be 
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around fifty, the m^ority of whom were shot in the head or thorax, with 
some 200 sufifering gunshot wounds. {El Nuevo Diario, 1984.) 
Press reports indicate that humble inhabitants not involved in the 
uprising comprised a m^ority of fatalities. In fact, the fact that the only 
member of the armed force shot was accidendy fired up by another 
soldier shows irrefutably that the demonstrators were unarmed; that 
no exchange of gunfire occurred, but rather a massacre of ordinary 
people. 
The Uprising, As Seen by Dominican Sociologists at the Time 
The uprising expressed a general crisis in Dominican society, and 
various sociologists have provided interpretations. Wilfredo Lozano 
(1997, 262) proposed that the social explosions were "an expression 
of the breakdown of populist hegemony over the urban masses." Laura 
Faxas notes this idea and proposes that the uprising represented the 
crisis of the national-popular myth that the PRD had created in the 
country since 1962. When the democratic transition took place in 
1978, and a leader of the PRD assumed the administration of the 
state, the myth began to break down and definitively collapsed during 
the uprising of April 1984. This happened because, while in power, 
PRD administrations did not fulfill the promises made during the 
repressive years of the Balaguer regime (Faxas, 2007,18). Faxas cor­
rectly points to a profound crisis in the populism of the PRD. The 
party continued to maintain its populist discourse, but its actions at 
the head of the National Executive branch and its relationship with 
the dominant socioeconomic elite changed forever. The popular 
national project had come to an end because the PRD had opted for 
becoming integrated into the mainstream of state and society. The 
PRD leadership appeared to be unaware that a democracy stripped 
of its socioeconomic decision-making system could not respond to 
the needs of citizens. 
For his part, Carlos Dore Cabral proposed that, contrary to 
what was commonly thought at that time, the uprising did not occur 
throughout the capital or in all the cities in the interior, but rather in 
the most impoverished neighborhoods. In a study of the newspapers 
El Nacional and Listin Diario, Dore Cabral looked for articles related to 
the uprising between April and September of 1984 in Santo Domingo. 
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He found t±iat "the 93 areas with population that the ONE (National 
Office of Statistics) recognizes, 67, that is, 72% of the total, do not 
appear in the newspapers that were studied, and only 26, that is, 28% 
of the total, are found in articles from those six months." That indicates 
that the protagonists of the "insurrection without arms" of April 1984 
were residents of the marginalized neighborhoods which are located in the 
surroundings of Santo Domingo. In the most important mass demonstra­
tions that have taken place in the country following the revolution of April 
1965, the petty bourgeoisie ... did not participate in their organization or 
leadership. One should look for the explanation of this fact in the discon­
nect that exists between these actions and the established political forces. 
(Dore Cabral, 1985a, 19-26.) 
This finding has great significance for understanding the grass­
roots movement following the April uprising. It explains why the par­
ties and political movements of the left, right, and center could not 
see what followed. The members of these organizations did not live 
in those neighborhoods, and consequentiy, tJiey failed to grasp how 
profoundly the Government's economic measures would affect those 
neighborhoods (Dore Cabral, 1985b, 13-15). Altiiough Dore Cabral's 
reflections are limited to the capital, a study of eight newspapers by 
this author leads to the conclusion that the same thing happened in 
many of the cities of the interior. 
What We Learn from the Uprising in Retrospect 
The uprising of April 1984 did not contribute directly to the 
construction of social citizenship, but it revealed the social conse­
quences of the transference of the socioeconomic decision-making 
system to the IME The revolt showed that the managers of the state 
and the socioeconomic elite faced serious limitations in attempting 
to fulfill the promises of a democratic society while implementing 
IMF-style economic policies. They also confronted national structural 
constraints posed by widespread social inequality and the authoritar­
ian political culture that permeates all political constituencies. The 
rebellion exposed the inability of established political parties to bring 
about social change. The PRD strategy of bringing cohesion to society 
through the development of Neighborhood Committees that linked 
local governments to communities did network, because of shifting 
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political strategy and scarce resources. As with other mainstream politi­
cal parties, the PRD applied a clientelistic system to recruit activists 
into the party rather than strengthening local institutions and social 
citizenship. In addition, labor leaders, who had functioned as the 
vanguard of the grassroots movement, were surprised by the uprising. 
They tried to lead it by calling for a nationwide strike against the IMF-
inspired policies, but nobody listened to the call. This demonstrated 
that labor leaders no longer had much influence in the neighborhoods 
when the uprising occurred. Militants of the left had been working 
in Santo Domingo's slums, but they had not been able to consolidate 
their presence and were overtaken by the events. As for the grassroots 
organizations, they were fragile and unable to build alliances with 
groups or individuals situated in high places. 
By revealing existing high levels of misery and poverty, the upris­
ing contributed to raising the consciousness of some sectors of the 
petty bourgeoisie regarding citizens' rights. In particular, it caused 
many young, petty bourgeois professionals to become involved with 
social struggles. A good number of these young people began to work 
in neighborhood organizations such as the Committee for the Defense 
of Neighborhood Rights (COPADEBA), and Alternative City, an NGO 
that emerged to technically support the social work of COPADEBA 
in the neighborhoods in the north zone of Santo Domingo. Others 
joined, as we shall see below: the Council of Popular Unity (CUP), 
the Committees for Popular Struggle (CLPs), and parties on the left. 
The emergence of the CUP and the CLPs illuminate how the 
uprising contributed to raising the level of consciousness among the 
politically active members of society. These organizations were able to 
develop a strongprotest movement, which culminated with a nation­
wide strike in February 1985. The strike's success sparked the develop­
ment of a grassroots movement independent of parties on the right, 
the center-left or the state. Interestingly, this new movement also 
remained independent of labor, which until then had spearheaded 
the grassroots movement. 
The Council of Popular Unity, the CLPs, 
and the Grassroots Movement 
The CUP emerged as one of the strongest neighborhood orga­
nizations after April 1984. It arose out of debates that took place on 
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the left regarding what route they should take in order to achieve .a 
socialist revolution. The great dilemma for the CUP was- whether it 
should follow the lead of the "Revolutionary Left," which believed that 
the revolution was "imminent," or whether it should integrate with 
the work of the organization of the neighborhood residents. At that 
time, the left promoted a penetration of cultural and sports clubs in 
the neighborhoods in order to incorporate them into its strategy of 
socialist revolution. On the other hand, the announced goal of the 
CUP was to develop an autonomous grassroots movement in which 
activists from all political parties could participate. The first CUP core 
groups were created on May 19 in the east zone, and on June 3 in the 
north zone of Santo Domingo. Later on, core groups emerged in the 
south region and in Cibao, particularly in the northeast. Given that 
the CUP's core groups wanted to be pluralist and attract people of 
different political affiliations, from the beginning, they denounced 
the slogan of "imminent revolution" and proposed to head the protest 
movement then developing throughout the country. Following the 
tradition of cultural and sports clubs, and even of the Ecclesiastic Base 
Communities, the leaders of the CUP proved genuinely interested in 
incorporating young people from marginalized neighborhoods into 
the cultural organizations. They wanted to instill environmental values 
in them, and above all, get them involved in the movement against 
urban removal projects that were beginning to occur in the north 
and east zones at the end of the 1980s. In spite of these efforts, only 
in September 1984 did the CUP begin to be known as an emerging 
organization that united diverse CLPs in the impoverished slums of 
Santo Domingo. By February 1985, the CUP maintained that it united 
60 popular organizations, and based on this representativeness, it 
presented itself as one of the organizations with greatest presence 
in Santo Domingo (Jimenez, 1985; Alvarez, interview, 2007; Franco, 
interview, 2010). 
The Strike of February 1985 
The CUP, the Dominican Leftist Front along with more than 
30 CLPs and popular organizations of diverse political-ideological 
orientation, developed a strategy of staggered work stoppages that 
culminated in the declaration of a national strike on February 11,1985. 
Among the demands of these stoppages was a call for the government 
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to break with the IMF, revoke the price increases, establish a mini­
mum salary of 350 pesos per month and eight pesos per day in the 
rural zones, a readjustment of 25% for those making 600, 30% for 
those making 800 and 10% for those making 1000. In addition, they 
demanded agricultural reform, the nationalization of foreign enter­
prises, cessation of political repression, and that INESPRE should 
supply the small- and medium-sized retailers (Ultima Hora, 1985). The 
staggered work stoppages began in early September, in both Santo 
Domingo and the interior. The fact that no violence occurred during 
the stoppages shows that the new strategy of the CLPs worked. They 
demanded the government respect civil, political, and social rights 
of citizens, which are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic. 
They proclaimed the strike peaceful and rejected violence. 
In early April the press reported several stoppages in the slums 
of Santo Domingo and cities of the interior (Taveras, 1985; Azcona, 
1985a; 1985b). Even though the government deployed a large num­
ber of National Police patrols during the two weeks of the stoppages, 
only sporadic confrontations occurred with demonstrators. This was 
in- stark contrast with the government stance during the uprising of 
April 1S84. Nevertheless, the police harassed the neighborhood lead­
ers (especially those known to have ties with the left). 
The government did everything possible to shut down the strike 
on February 11, and when that failed, attempted- to limit its scope at 
the national level. The President even took the lead by offering to 
lower prices on basic goods a couple of days before the strike, to see 
if that would halt its impetus. However, the strike organizers were not 
impressed and reiterated their demands, despite lack of support from 
labor unions (Bujosa Mieses, 1985). 
A variety of "newspaper reports indicates that the general strike 
was a total success for its organizers. Significantiy the strike proved 
peaceful in nature and incidents between the strikers and the police 
remained limited to a few neighborhoods in the city. In the principal 
cities of Cibao, in the north, the entire population embraced it. The 
same thing occurred in the east (Mora; Bujosa Mieses, 1985). Even 
Don Rafael Herrera, editor of the conservative Listin Diario, recog­
nized the strike's success. In his judgment, "the strike was a success 
for its organizers. We sincerely deplore it. The strike was peaceful. We 
sincerely celebrate it" (cited in Lora, 1985). This recognition meant 
that the state and dominant socioeconomic elites had to take notice; 
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a social movement was developing not under the control of the domi­
nant parties, and this could have dangerous implications for social 
stability. The state was losing control of the demonstrations, much 
to their chagrin, and'consequently, they needed to take measures so 
that these movements would return to the fold. 
The Jorge Blanco administration understood that it had to act in 
order to calm the situation of social and political tension. The Presi­
dent decreed concrete measures to ensure that the processing plant 
of INESPRE would produce low-priced milk. It readjusted electric bills 
and emitted a decree exempting sardines, codfish, and herring from 
import taxes (Lopez Reyes, 1985; Olivo, 1985). These announcements 
revealed the success of the strike. 
The staggered work stoppages and the general strike of February 
11 showed that the grassroots organizations could act without being 
managed from union headquarters. A new type of social movement 
was beginning to form that demanded autonomy with regard to the 
traditional political parties. The CUP and the CLPs appeared as the 
new subjects of change, and exhibited their capacity to conduct a 
strike without violence. The peaceful strike resulted in fewer demon­
strators being detained, despite substantial law enforcement patrols 
and random arrests. On this occasion, the protests coincided with 
the desires of the slum dwellers, who did not want violence in their 
neighborhoods, and pardy because of that, the work stoppages had 
greater support in the urban slums and in rural communities. This 
led the CUP and the CLPs to want to continue with the strategy of 
staggered work stoppages at the local and national levels in order to 
obtain certain concessions. 
Social tensions continued throughout 1985 and work stoppages 
occurred in different neighborhoods of the capital and the prov­
inces. During the course of the year, the CUP and the CLPs grew 
significandy, and had high visibility in the press. Their leaders, Pedro 
Franco and Jose Pichardo, had become well-known figures,- because 
they frequently called press conferences and publicized schedules of 
CUP activities, where they maintained their critiques of government 
policies. Through its actions, the CUP established the basis for initiat­
ing the formation of an autonomous grassroots movement that would 
fight toward the construction of social citizenship. By means of stag­
gered work stoppages, they raised the consciousness of neighborhood 
residents regarding the possibility of getting the authorities to respond 
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to some of their needs by means of protests, marches, and confronta­
tions with law enforcement groups. Nevertheless, these organizations 
still needed to have a greater presence in the slums. The CUP had 
this in mind, but the majority on the left remained interested in the 
socialist revolution and not in constructing local institutions like the 
Neighborhood Committees that were organically tied to the city halls. 
The construction of strong organizations in the slums proved to be 
the left's great challenge in the mid-1980s and beyond. 
The protest cycle of the 1980s continued until 1992, when a series 
of international and national events forced a precipitous decline of 
social movement activities. On the international scale, the Gulf War 
in the Middle East (August 1990) forced an increase in oil prices and 
social movement actors could not blame the government for it. The 
IMF successfully "persuaded" the government to deepen neoliberal 
economic reforms, which led to privatization of most state-owned 
assets, leading to layoffs, and weakening labor. While the government 
succeeded in implementing neoliberalism and creating macroeco-
nomic stability, the grassroots movement suffered political fragmenta­
tion and lost steam. In the meantime, Non-Govemmental Organiza­
tions (NGOs) emerged as a new social sector in the 1990s with full 
support from private and government foundations in Europe and 
the United States. This, of course, further offset the type of activi­
ties grassroots organization had in the slums. Contrary to grassroots 
organizations, NGOs provided, on a limited scale, needed services in 
rural and urban communities and preached subordinated integration 
into society rather than contentious actions. 
The actions of NGOs coincided with neoliberal globalization, 
which was producing a cultural shift whereby individualism, consum­
erism, and a desire to get rich quickly using illicit means replaced 
solidarity. Petty bourgeois intellectuals and leftist militants who used 
to support the grassroots and labor movements took positions in 
government, the private sector or migrated abroad. The decline of 
the grassroots movement put claims for social citizenship rights on 
the back burner, while government, NGOs, and mainstream politi­
cal parties used clientelistic mechanisms to coopt those with social 
move.ment experience. 
In closing, it is worth noting that since 2009 new petty bour­
geois movements, unconnected to the grassroots, have emerged. 
The environmental and the 4% movement for education stand out. 
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The environmental movement began in March 2009 when peasants 
from the community of Gonzalo, in Monte Plata, near the capital, 
protested that the government had issued a permit to Grupo Estrella, 
an important local firm, to construct a cement plant three kilometers 
away from Los Haitises National Park. The issue caused a national 
uproar. President Leonel Fernandez (2008-2012) had to ask the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to conduct a fea­
sibility study. This study confirmed the accusations and the permit 
had to be withdrawn. Similarly, environmentalist protests forced 
President Danilo Medina (who took office in 2012) to ask the UNDP 
for another feasibility study concerning a permit to Xtrata Nickel-
Glencore to exploit gold in Loma Miranda. Again, the UNDP study 
confirmed local allegations about environmental damage and the 
government had to withdraw the mining permit. However, it warned 
that if an adequate technology to exploit the mine becomes avail­
able, the government should re-visit the issue. In the meantime, the 
environmentalists enlisted the support of the Catholic Church and 
got Congress to pass a law in August 2014 declaring Loma Miranda 
a National Park. However, in September President Medina vetoed 
the law, arguing that it was unconstitutional and violated a series of 
international conventions. Pressure from the business community 
that supports foreign investments combined with political in-fighting 
between Medina and Leonel Fernandez might explain the veto. 
Medina wants re-election and this conflicts with Fernandez's inter­
est to run in the 2016 presidential elections. In the meantime, the 
environmental movement has suffered a setback. 
The 4% Movement for Education emerged after four years of 
denunciations and protests about implementing the General Law of 
Education of 1997, which mandated 4% of the Gross National Prod­
uct (GNP) for pre-university education. After four years of intense 
mobilizations and protests, the 4% movement succeeded in getting 
President Medina to implement the General Law of Education. Since 
2012, Medina has ordered the initiation of a nationwide school con­
struction program. He has also ordered the establishment of public 
school programs from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. to replace the old system that 
held classes in the morning and afternoon with different groups of 
students. It is too early to evaluate this initiative, but Medina has 
embarked on an unprecedented program to improve school facilities, 
hire new teachers, and provide free lunches to students. 
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These two petty bourgeois movements have revived social move­
ments and the process of construction of citizenship rights. Unlike 
the grassroots, which always presented multiple demands associated 
with social citizenship, these movements are single-issue oriented and, 
so far, have not ventured onto other concerns. This experience shows 
that the strategy of building alliances with groups in high places and 
using the media and symbols to carry their message has worked. As 
such, they have brought back the issue of social citizenship to national 
attention. 
Conclusion 
This article builds on the sociological literature that credits social 
movements for their contribution to the construction of social citizen­
ship. Going beyond citizenship theories, it seeks to understand the 
linkages between social movements and the construction of social 
•citizenship. The findings here reveal the inability of the state and 
selites io' iniplement neoliberal economic policies and simultaneously 
to advance, the social democratic process. Likewise, they show the 
inability of the political parties to serve as vehicle of social change. 
The strategy of the PRD to develop Neighborhood Committees and 
sports clubs to bring cohesion to society and develop social citizenship 
failed because, of its shifting strategy and scarce resources. Similarly, 
the political parties of the left failed to coordinate their efforts with 
those of the residents of the neighborhoods and were caught oflfguard 
during the uprising of 1984. 
Despite great struggles of resistance in the 1980s, the gains of the 
Dominican grassroots movement were limited. Perhaps, the mavimiim 
achievement was to pose a worthwhile goal that may be revisited by 
Dominican society in the near future. A lesson to be learned is that 
labor, grassroots, and petty bourgeois movements will have to establish 
stronger organizations to wage their demands for citizenship rights 
and unite around basic demands. This is just the beginning of the 
story; building social citizenship takes a long time; it is a process of 
advances and setbacks. The gradual decline of labor and grassroots 
movements since the 1990s has impacted social citizenship negatively. 
Nevertheless, new petty bourgeois movements emerged after 2009, 
and they have adopted some of the demands of the grassroots and 
labor movements. However, it remains to be seen whether the scattered 
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and uncoordinated local protests of the grassroots movement will 
absorb this lesson and develop into a full-fledged moverrient that can 
deepen social citizenship. 
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